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Abstract 
The study of the relationship between conflict and poverty is very relevant in a country like 
Colombia, suffering one of the longest internal conflicts still present in the world today and being 
the second country in South America with the highest percentage of people below the poverty 
line.  This study uses government deterrence measures as instruments of several conflict-specific 
variables to estimate the impact of conflict on poverty in Colombia. Using census-level data at the 
municipality level for 2005, I assess the effect on both the urban and rural incidence of the newly 
developed Multidimensional Poverty Index. The findings show that the incidence of conflict 
significantly increases rural poverty. This is consistent with the fact that most of the conflict in 
Colombia takes place in rural areas. I also explore the lagged effect of conflict on poverty to 
conclude that it lasts for at least three years, but decreases over time.  Finally, I show that the 
results are robust to a battery of additional specifications, including the use of alternative conflict 
data and a modified version of the dependent variable. 
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1. Introduction 
Poverty and conflict are closely related. Violent conflicts have led to high numbers of deaths 
and displaced people, material destruction and even state collapse. In most of the world, conflict 
has long lasting effects that inhibit economic development.2 The opposite argument is however 
also true: Poor people have a lower opportunity cost of engaging in illegal or violent activities and 
this may fuel conflict and crime (Becker, 1968). Hence, economic decline and poverty may 
reinforce tendencies to resort to violent means. Indeed, many researchers have observed that 
poverty and conflict go hand in hand, and have found that there is a strong negative relationship 
between GDP per capita and violent conflict across countries (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; and Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004).  
Given the usual identification concerns pertaining to the potential reverse causality 
between conflict and poverty, or the presence of omitted variables, it is difficult to identify the 
impact of conflict on poverty. Nevertheless, the aim of this study is to estimate this impact for the 
case of Colombia. In particular, using the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) at the municipality 
level, I study the effect of conflict on poverty distinguishing between its urban and its rural 
incidence. Of course, as mentioned before, there are endogeneity challenges that I resolve 
instrumenting conflict with the number of illegal drug laboratories dismantled and the number of 
weapons seized, all of which are government deterrence measures. These instruments should be 
highly correlated with armed conflict given that they proxy for both the presence and 
effectiveness of the government to counteract criminal activity in the region. However, these 
measures are unlikely to affect poverty directly. This is the basic identification strategy of this 
study, and will be explained in more detail.  
The government deterrence measures have already been used in other studies of the 
consequences of armed conflict in Colombia. For instance, Camacho and Rodríguez (2011) 
instrument conflict with illegal drug laboratories dismantled and antinarcotic operations, to 
estimate the causal effect that armed conflict has on entrepreneurial activity in Colombia. 
Moreover, Rodríguez and Sánchez (2012) estimate the effect of armed conflict exposure on school 
drop-out and labor decisions of Colombian children, by instrumenting conflict with the number of 
captures of assassins. 
                                                          
2 See World Bank (2003) for a review. 
 
3 
 
The question of the causal effect of conflict on poverty in a country like Colombia is very 
relevant, since the country suffers one of the longest internal conflicts still present in the world 
today and is the second country in South America with the highest percentage of people below 
the poverty line (World Bank, 2008). 
Colombia has experienced civil conflict for about five decades. In the early sixties two 
guerrilla organizations emerged, respectively known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both based on communist ideas. In 
addition, in the early eighties right-wing paramilitary groups emerged, and in 1997 they formed an 
umbrella organization known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Although AUC 
demobilized between 2003 and 2006, some of its members are still undertaking criminal activities 
and have formed the so called bandas criminales. These three groups are involved in drug 
production and trafficking operations, which are known to be the main financing source of the 
Colombian armed groups. They do not engage only in a direct fighting with the national army, but 
also perpetrate crimes against the civilian population, private assets and public infrastructure. 
They have committed several attacks in most of the country’s territory, affecting most of the 
population (Rabassa and Chalk, 2001). Thus, it is likely that the activity of these groups impoverish 
affected populations. Measuring the magnitude of this impact is the aim of this paper.  
Poverty in South America has fallen steadily over the last decade, most likely owing to 
favorable economic conditions and innovative social programs such as conditional cash transfers. 
Colombia, while exhibiting a trend similar to that of the region, shows less encouraging results. In 
2008, according to World Bank, Colombia was the second country in the region with the highest 
percentage of people below the poverty line (measured as US$1.25 per day), after Bolivia. Again, 
armed conflict in Colombia may explain to some extent the underperformance of the country 
relative to its neighbors.  
As mentioned before, this study measures poverty with the MPI, an index based on the 
methodology of Alkire and Foster (2010). The proposed index for Colombia is composed of 15 
indicators grouped by five dimensions: household education conditions; childhood and youth 
conditions; health; employment; and households’ living conditions and access to utilities (see 
Table 8 in the appendix). A person is considered poor if he has 33% of deprivations.  A nested 
4 
 
weighting structure is used to compute the index for each household, where each dimension is 
equally weighted, as is each indicator within each dimension.3 
Alkire, Roche, Santos and Seth (2011a) state that a key advantage of the MPI is that it is able 
to ‘zoom in’ and explore the incidence, intensity and depth of poverty by states, provinces or other 
geographical regions, capturing reductions in the number of people who are poor as well as in the 
intensity of poverty. Moreover, the MPI is the first international measure to reflect the intensity of 
poverty – the number of deprivations that each person faces at the same time. In this way, the 
MPI goes beyond other poverty measures to reveal the combination of deprivations that batter a 
person at the same time, which has been designed as a tool to help eradicate poverty. 
A multidimensional poverty measure should capture welfare losses that result when poor 
households face greater deprivations. As Angulo, Diaz and Pardo (2013) indicate, The Unsatisfied 
Basic Needs (UBN) measure, one of the multidimensional indices traditionally used in Colombia, 
does not change if a poor household increases its number of deprivations. Also, a poverty measure 
should only reflect improvements among the universe of poor people, a property that the Living 
Conditions Index (LCI), another traditional multidimensional index used in Colombia, fails to fulfill 
as it is sensitive to changes in the living conditions of the non-poor. On the other hand, there are 
problems with the content of these indices as well, so they are arguably becoming poor 
instruments for measuring poverty. Because of this, the measure that I use in this study is the MPI, 
which looks at poverty through a ‘high-resolution’ lens, including variables that had not been 
included in previous multidimensional indices and satisfying a set of axiomatic properties that 
allows for the definition of consistent profiles of multidimensional poverty.4 
The negative consequences of civil conflict on economic activity and human wellbeing have 
been widely studied. The outcomes studied include economic growth, income, wealth, poverty, 
education, health and the environment, among others (see Vargas, 2012 for a review). Most of the 
existing literature has focused on cross-country evidence at the aggregate level. Collier (1999) 
estimates that countries that experience civil conflict grow approximately 2.2 less percentage 
points than peaceful countries. Stewart et al. (2001) find that fifteen out of sixteen countries that 
have experienced an internal conflict suffered a decrease in their GDP per capita. This evidence, 
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although suggestive, may suffer from limitations such as measurement error, omitted variable bias 
and reverse causality. Indeed, the other direction of causality on conflict and income/poverty has 
also been studied at the cross-country level, but this branch of the literature also suffers from 
identification problems (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003; and Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).5  
At the subnational level, the first studies that estimate the economic costs of conflict in 
Colombia are Rubio (1995) and Trujillo and Badel (1997). Using accounting techniques to compute 
such costs, both studies conclude that the total costs of armed conflict and illegal activities in the 
country amount to around 15% of GDP. The social and economic costs of conflict in Colombia have 
also been studied by Fernandez, Ibáñez and Peña (2011), and Arias, Ibáñez and Zambrano (2013). 
Both studies show that households adapt to conflict in different ways, for instance by shifting 
labor supply to non-agricultural activities and taking other sub-optimal agricultural decisions.6 The 
other direction of causality (economic conditions to conflict) has also been studied in Colombia, 
see for example Montenegro and Posada (1995), and Becerra and Sarmiento (1999).7  
Even though previous research has studied the relationship between poverty and conflict, 
there are several contributions of the present study. While most of the previous literature has 
used a cross-country approach, I exploit subnational variation within a single country (Colombia), 
which helps me overcome identification concerns. Moreover, while the cross-country literature 
focuses on GDP per capita as the main proxy for poverty, I use a newly developed comprehensive 
poverty measure.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main results and robustness checks and finally 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
In this paper, I use an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. This approach not only 
addresses the potential reverse causality, but also reduces any possible bias due to (classical) 
measurement error or omitted variables. An instrument in this specific case is an exogenous 
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source of variation for conflict that otherwise is unrelated to poverty. Illegal drug laboratories 
dismantled and weapons seized are good candidates because they reflect government deterrence 
(actions that are typically carried out by the military), while at the same time are unlikely to have a 
direct impact on poverty.8 
The model that I will estimate is based on a two stages least squares approach. In the first 
stage, the endogenous variable of interest (Conflict) is regressed against the instrument (a vector 
of government deterrence measures, Deterrence) and a rich set of municipality-level controls (X).9 
All these variables vary across municipalities (m), and time (t). However, because the dependent 
variable is only available for one year (2005), my estimation only exploits the cross sectional 
variation. In turn, I do explore the effect of different lags of the independent variables to assess 
the duration of the effect. 
 
The estimated model is given by: 
 
                                   
 
In turn, the second stage can be described by: 
 
                            ̂                                
 
where the outcome (poverty as measured by the MPI) is explained by the predicted value of the 
endogenous variable of interest from the first stage.10 
The deterrence actions should be significantly correlated with armed conflict in the first 
equation, given that they proxy for both the presence and the effectiveness of the government to 
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counteract criminal activity in a specific region. Indeed, all Colombian armed groups use drug 
production and distribution as a major financing source, as well as a large variety of weapons to 
carry out their operations. Hence, higher values of laboratories dismantled and weapons seized 
are likely to proxy for higher presence of government forces and in turn, this is likely to hinder 
illegal activities, including the actions of illegal armed groups. Therefore, one would a priori expect 
a negative association between the deterrence measures and armed conflict. However, the 
opposite sign should not be ruled out since one can also expect illegal armed groups try to protect 
their sources of finance (e.g. laboratories), or force (e.g. weaponry and ammunition) through 
armed attacks.11 Critically, the only channel through which the deterrence actions are likely to 
affect poverty is through conflict, which means that the exclusion restriction is met. Indeed, 
deterrence actions are normally secret operations that occur in environments not easily detected 
by the civilian population, and households do not easily observe the level of deterrence. It follows 
that government deterrence operations are unlikely to directly affect poverty.  
It is worth noting however that the effect of conflict on poverty is not necessarily 
immediate. Contemporaneous poverty may not only be explained by conflict in 2005 but also by 
past levels of this variable. I then explore a flexible lag structure of conflict (as well as the 
instruments) in my empirical exercise. 
 
3. Data  
To examine econometrically the connection between armed conflict and poverty, I use data 
on both on the incidence of conflict and on poverty rates. In terms of the latter, I use the Census-
based MPI poverty measure (2005). This is computed at the municipality level and, within each 
municipality, the aggregate rate can be divided into urban and rural rates. One caveat to be 
noticed is that, because it is based on census data, my outcome variable is only measured in one 
cross section. Indeed, it is impossible to compute the MPI based on the 1993 Census.12  
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Since it can be argued that access to health insurance (one of the variables used to compute 
the MPI) doesn’t monotonically map to poverty and living conditions, for robustness I re-calculate 
an MPI-equivalent index that excludes such variable.13 As I will show, my results are robust to this. 
For the conflict data I use a detailed event-based data from the Center for the Study for 
Armed Conflict (CERAC), updated by Universidad del Rosario. For every event the conflict dataset 
records its type, the date, location, perpetrator, and victims involved in the incident. The dataset is 
described thoroughly by Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (2004). From this dataset I use the following 
variables: guerrilla attacks, paramilitary attacks, attacks from unknown groups and the number of 
conflict-driven casualties. An attack is defined as a violent event in which there is no direct armed 
combat between two groups. Attacks include explosive terrorist attacks, arsonist terrorist attacks, 
other terrorist attacks, route blocking, harassing and ambushes, among others. Casualties, which 
are the number of people killed, is a conflict intensity measure. As mentioned before, I take into 
account the potential lagged effect of conflict on poverty. Thus, my conflict data covers the period 
2002 to 2005.  
In addition, the instruments (illegal drug laboratories dismantled and weapons seized) are 
taken from a database from the Center of the Studies for Economic Development (CEDE). I also 
take these variables for the period 2002-2005. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the poverty measure, the incidence of conflict 
and the instruments. Poverty is higher in rural than in urban areas: in 2005, 80% of the population 
in rural areas lived in poverty, while only 39% in urban areas did. Note that while in some areas as 
little as 14% of the population lived in poverty is 2005, in some others the entire population was 
classified as poor. In terms of the incidence of conflict, on average a municipality in 2005 has 0.2 
(guerrilla and paramilitary) attacks, 0.27 attacks from unknown groups, and 1.34 conflict-driven 
casualties. Finally, the deterrence measures exhibit a similar behavior on average: 0.22 
laboratories dismantled and 0.37 weapons seized. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Using the IV approach described in section 2, I estimate the contemporaneous and lagged 
effect of conflict on poverty. Tables 2A through 2D examine respectively the effect of guerrilla 
                                                          
13
 I am greateful to Adriana Camacho for this suggestion. 
9 
 
attacks, paramilitary attacks, unknown attacks, and conflict-driven casualties on poverty. In 
addition, each table is divided into two panels and four columns. Panel A reports the first stage 
and Panel B reports the second. The columns report the contemporaneous and lagged effects up 
to the third lag (when the effect disappears).  
Focusing on the first stage, the relationship between the instruments and the incidence of 
conflict is typically positive. This is consistent with the hypothesis, already mentioned, that 
government deterrence actions are challenged by the illegal groups. While in some cases either 
the laboratories dismantled or the weapons seized (but very rarely both of them together) are not 
significant, it is noteworthy that the instruments are generally relevant. One exception is the 
contemporaneous effect of paramilitary attacks (Table 2B, Panel A).  This is consistent with the 
fact that the AUC reached its peak of expansion in 2002, declaring in December that year a 
unilateral cease fire which let to peace negotiations in 2003 with the government of president 
Uribe (2002-2010). In fact, by 2005 the large majority of the former paramilitary forces had 
already demobilized.  
Panel A of the tables reports as well the F-Test of excluded instruments. The null hypothesis 
of this test is generally rejected, ensuring that under this specification my estimations do not 
suffer from a weak instruments problem. Again, an exception is the contemporaneous effect of 
the paramilitary attacks, for the reasons mentioned. 
Focusing on the second stage, all of my proxies of armed conflict have a positive effect on 
rural and urban poverty, but this effect is only significant for rural areas. This is intuitive as most of 
the conflict takes place in rural zones. Something interesting to be noted from the lagged 
specification is that the effect of conflict on rural poverty becomes smaller over time. A possible 
explanation for this is that households get used to live in the presence of conflict (when they live 
in regions with prolonged illegal armed groups’ presence). This is consistent with the 
interpretation of Fernandez et al. (2011) and Arias et al. (2013). The positive and significant effect 
on rural poverty remains up to the second lag window in 2003. It is no longer significant starting in 
2002 (results of longer lags not presented). 
Because all the conflict-specific variables are standardized, coefficients should be 
interpreted as the impact (in percentage points of poverty) of one additional standard deviation of 
each conflict variable. The contemporaneous effect of one standard deviation increase in guerrilla 
attacks (Table 2A, column 1) is an increase on rural poverty of 3.7 percentage points. A one 
standard deviation increase in the first and second lag of guerrilla attacks (columns 2 and 3) 
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increase rural poverty by 1.9 and 1.6 percentage points respectively. Starting from the third lag 
(column 4), the effect is no longer significant.   
Turning to the effect of paramilitary attacks on poverty (Table 2B), the only significant 
effects are given by the first and second lag of paramilitary attacks (columns 2 and 3). A one 
standard deviation increase in these, increase rural poverty by 3.4 and 3 percentage points 
respectively. The effect of attacks from unknown groups (Table 2C) is somewhat larger; with the 
contemporaneous effect of one standard deviation increase (column 1) being 6.5 percentage 
points increase on rural poverty. This effect drops to 2.9 percentage points increase by the third 
lag (column 4).  
Finally, the contemporaneous effect of one additional standard deviation of conflict-related 
casualties (Table 2D, column 1) is an increase on rural poverty of 3.7 percentage points. The 
smallest effect of casualties, observed in the second lag (2003), is an increase on rural poverty of 
1.5 percentage points (column 3).  
Across all tables Panel B reports as well the Sargan Test to assess the exogeneity of my 
instruments. None of the Sargan Tests from my different lag windows rejects the null hypothesis 
that, assuming that one of the instruments is exogenous, the second one is also exogenous.  
Given the inclusion of a large set of controls, some of which are missing for some 
municipalities, the resulting sample in my estimations is 908 out of the 1123 municipalities. This 
sample loss was studied carefully to think of any potential selection problem. Table 3 suggests that 
while I’m losing poorer municipalities (according to both the MPI and the UBN), the municipalities 
lost are slightly less violent. However, a t-test for differences in means (reported in Table 3) 
suggests that these differences are not statistically significant in any of the conflict measures 
across used and the lost samples. Because I am losing municipalities that are poorer but not 
significantly different in terms of the incidence of conflict, if anything my results underestimate 
the effect of conflict on poverty. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
I assess the robustness of my results in different ways. First, given that one of the 
components of the MPI is the access to health insurance and that the proportion of insured 
households is likely to have a U-form with respect to living conditions (the poor and the rich are 
generally affiliated, while the non-poor and the non-rich are not), I construct a synthetic MPI 
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excluding this variable.14 The results, summarized in Table 4, are largely similar to the benchmark 
results already explained in section 4.1.15 The effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
guerrilla attacks, paramilitary attacks and conflict-related casualties on rural poverty is smaller 
than the obtained in the benchmark results. Unlike the benchmark results, attacks from unknown 
groups have no effect on rural poverty. Furthermore, in this case the duration of the effect seems 
to be smaller: Starting from the second lag (2003), the effect of the four conflict measures is no 
longer significant.  
In addition, given the availability of different conflict databases, in Tables 5A through 5D, 
the conflict-related variables are taken from the CEDE conflict database. Once more, the first stage 
reports a typically positive relationship between the instruments and the incidence of conflict. 
Indeed, the instruments are relevant (including the contemporaneous effect of paramilitary 
attacks, a difference with the benchmark results). The effect of conflict on rural poverty is positive 
and significant, and to some extent smaller than the obtained with the CERAC/URosario database 
(one exception is the contemporaneous effect of casualties on rural poverty [Table 5D], being 
bigger under the CEDE database). Generally, the interpretation is the same as in the baseline 
results. 
Another robustness check includes in the set of controls land inequality. It is important to 
say that these data exclude all the 125 municipalities of Antioquia, which has its own cadaster that 
is not public. Something to be noted is that the laboratories dismantled and the weapons seized 
together are not significant in the contemporaneous and first lag effect of paramilitary attacks and 
unknown attacks (Tables 6B and 6C). In turn, these two variables have no effect on rural poverty 
for those estimations. In addition, the effect of guerrilla attacks (Table 6A) and conflict-driven 
casualties (Table 6D) on poverty is slightly smaller than in the baseline results. This effect is no 
longer significant in the second lag (2003). This is likely to be a consequence of the sample loss.  
Finally, because my dependent variable is census-based, I exclude from the sample 
municipalities with high census omission.  According to the National Administrative Department of 
Statistics (DANE), high census omission is defined as a municipality in which more than the 20% of 
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in the appendix.   
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the population was not censed; and one should treat them with caution. The results, summarized 
in Tables 7A through 7D, resemble the baseline first and second stage estimations, as well as the 
baseline magnitude and duration of the effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of conflict on poverty in Colombia. Most of the 
empirical literature focuses on the opposite direction of causality, namely the effect of poverty on 
conflict. Moreover, most of the previous studies proxy poverty by GDP per capita (or analyze 
income shocks), instead I use a newly developed, official poverty measure. Finally, I deal with 
potential reverse causality; omitted variable bias and measurement error using an IV approach. 
I instrument conflict with the number of laboratories dismantled and the number of 
weapons seized, all of which are government deterrence measures. These instruments are 
significantly correlated with armed conflict given that they proxy for both the presence and 
effectiveness of the government to counteract criminal activity in the region. Instead, the 
government deterrence operations are unlikely to directly affect poverty, since they are secret 
operations that occur in environments not easily detected by the civilian population.  
The findings provide evidence that the conflict has a positive and significant effect on rural 
poverty, but not in urban areas. This is intuitive as most of the conflict is perpetrated in rural 
areas. Moreover, I explore different lag windows of conflict incidence to assess the duration of the 
effect of conflict on poverty. The effect of conflict on poverty becomes smaller over time (with the 
effect disappearing after the third lag). This could be due to the fact that households may get used 
to live in the presence of conflict, and is consistent with recent research of the effect of conflict on 
household behavior in Colombia. In addition, paramilitary attacks are not related to the 
government deterrence actions in 2005. These results are consistent with the fact that in this year 
many of the paramilitary forces had already demobilized.   
The results are robust to different robustness specifications. These includes: the estimation 
with a synthetic MPI (without access to health services), the use of a different conflict database 
(CEDE), the inclusion of land inequality as a control, and the exclusion from the sample of 
municipalities with high census omission.  
It is crucial to continue examining the relationship between conflict and poverty, for 
instance by exploiting in the future (when other census are carried out) panel data that allows to 
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control for unobserved municipal-specific heterogeneity which is time-invariant by including fixed 
effects.  
Finally, the results of this study provide additional evidence that the gains from peace are 
potentially very large and that the Colombian government should determinedly commit to bring 
the current peace negotiations with the FARC to a successful and lasting agreement.  
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A 2.  Appendix (Details on MPI) 
The Colombian government has made advances in the development and implementation of 
multidimensional poverty measures, moving away from unidimensional measures of poverty, 
mostly based on income or consumption. Some of the multidimensional indicators are the 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (UBN), the Human Opportunities Index (HOI), the Living Conditions 
Index (LCI) and the index used for social expenditure targeting, SISBEN. However, none of the 
existing indicators satisfies a set of axiomatic properties that, according to theorists, a consistent 
profile of multidimensional poverty should display (Alkire et al., 2011a). For this and other reasons 
(discussed in Alkire and Foster, 2011a) these indices are arguably incomplete instruments for 
measuring the incidence of poverty.  
Of these, the UBN is the only index created exclusively for poverty measurement. In 
contrast, both the LCI and SISBEN were developed with the aim of measuring wellbeing or quality 
of life, and although these concepts could proxy poverty in some circumstances this is not always 
the case (see Angulo, Diaz and Pardo, 2013 for a discussion). 
This is the context that led the National Planning Department to adapt for Colombia the 
methodology of Alkire and Foster (2010) and develop the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). 
The resulting index is composed of 15 indicators, grouped in five dimensions: household education 
conditions; childhood and youth conditions; health; employment; and households living conditions 
and access to utilities. A nested weighting structure is used, where each dimension is equally 
weighted, as is each indicator within each dimension. With this single measure policy makers can 
identify several features of the underlying poverty in a given territory: i) Its incidence (the 
percentage of multidimensionally poor); ii) Its intensity (the average deprivations among the 
poor); iii) Its depth (the average distance of the multidimensionally poor people from the non-poor 
threshold); iv) And its severity (the size of the gap within the poor, with a larger weight on the 
people who feature more deprivations).  
There are four types of methods for the identification of multidimensionally poor people: 
a) The unidimensional method aggregates the achievements of different dimensions into a 
single wellbeing variable and uses an aggregate cutoff point to identify the poor. 
Examples of this are the LCI and the SISBEN indices. One disadvantage of it is the loss of 
information on specific deprivations.  
b) The union method considers a person to be multidimensionally poor if he or she is 
deprived in at least one dimension. An example is the UBN index. One limitation of it is 
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that it may identify as poor people who are not, given that deprivation in one dimension 
may be due to reasons unrelated to poverty (like exceptional behavioral choices).  
c) The intersection approach identifies a person as poor if he or she is deprived in all of the 
indicator dimensions. Given the strictness of this method, it would underestimate 
poverty by determining that almost no one is poor. 
d) The dual-cutoff point approach is the one proposed by Alkire and Foster and used in 
computing the MPI. The first cutoff, defined separately for every dimension, determines 
whether a person is deprived in each dimension. The second cutoff is the share of 
deprivations above which a person is considered poor (which for the MPI 33% of 
deprivations, although this is a convention arguably arbitrary).  
One advantage of the MPI in comparison with previous multidimensional measures is that it 
fulfills of a number of axiomatic properties, which other measures do not fulfill. Some of these 
axiomatic properties that the MPI satisfies are: 
a) The deprivation focus axiom. If a household, which is not deprived in a particular 
dimension, receives a higher score in that dimension, the indicator does not change. 
The LCI and SISBEN are sensitive to changes across both deprived and non-deprived 
dimensions, and therefore neither of them satisfies this axiom.  
b) The poverty focus axiom. The index must reflect only improvements among the universe 
of poor people. A decrease in the share of deprivations of a non-poor household, which 
would increase its living conditions, does not change the poverty index. When the LCI 
and SISBEN averages are applied to a subgroup (as is generally the case), the 
measurement is sensitive to changes in the living conditions of the non-poor. In 
contrast, by construction the MPI censors vectors of realizations of the non-poor. In 
turn, this censoring allows isolating the changes in deprivations of the non-poor (but 
only changes whose magnitude is so that do not make them poor). This process ensures 
that the MPI satisfies the poverty focus axiom. In turn, the LCI and SISBEN do not satisfy 
this because they are synthetic indices and for using them in poverty, we should define 
a cutoff point after the aggregation, so that a change in the living conditions of the non-
poor affect the cardinality of the score (increasing it) and affect the poverty measure.  
c) The dimensional monotonicity axiom. If a poor household faces a new deprivation that 
was not previously suffered, a higher level of poverty will be recorded. The NBI, LCI, and 
SISBEN do not satisfy this axiom and do not reflect the breadth of deprivation.  
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d) The monotonicity axiom. Poverty decreases if an improvement occurs within a poor 
household’s deprived dimension. The UBN does not fulfill this axiom, as changes in the 
level of any indicator do not necessarily produce changes in the aggregated score.  
 
The MPI satisfies other axiomatic properties such as weak monotonicity, decomposability, 
replication invariance, symmetry, non-triviality, normalization, weak transfer, and weak 
rearrangement.  
 
Although the MPI seems to be a quite good index in terms of all these properties, it arguably 
remains somewhat arbitrary in terms of the variables feed into its score and the weights that are 
assigned to each of them. For instance, the inclusion of access to health insurance can be 
discussed. And indeed in this study I re-calculate for robustness purposes a synthetic MPI that 
excludes this dimension. However, the possibility of including specific variables is limited by the 
availability of information on these.  
On the other hand, there is no consensus on the weighting scheme that should be used. 
While currently the MPI in Colombia uses a weighing scheme by which each dimension receives an 
equal weight, as each variable within each dimension, other weighting conventions can be used. 
For instance, each dimension could exhibit a different weight according to the deprivation rates, 
but a constraint it faces is the moment in time when the weights are calculated. However, one of 
the limitations of the Colombian MPI is that the weight assigned to variables within dimensions 
that have many variables is lower in comparison to that of the variables within dimensions that 
have few variables. 16 
 
                                                          
16
 The construction of the MPI is explained thoroughly by Angulo, Diaz, and Pardo (2013). 
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